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Notes
THE LAW SCHOOL
One hundred and forty-six students enrolled in the
Law School this year. Thirty-five are Seniors; forty-eight
are Middlers; fifty-four are Juniors; and nine are elective
students taking work in the Law School and the College.
The total number of students, exclusive of electives, ex-
ceeds the number enrolled last year by one: The decrease
in the number of elective students is a temporary one due
to a change which has recently been made in the method
of electing law.
Of the one hundred and thirty-seven students, other
than electives, one hundred and twenty-six are college
graduates, representing thirty-five different colleges.
Twenty-three of these colleges are located in Pennsylvania
and twelve are located in other states.
Sixty-eight students, other than electives, enrolled in
the school for the first time; fifty-four entered the Junior
class; thirteen entered the Middler class; and one entered
the Senior class. Of these sixty-eight students, sixty-five
are college graduates; one has completed more than three
years of college work; one has completed two years of
college work; and one, who was educated in Europe, has
completed work which is more than the equivalent of a
college education in the United States.
During the past year the school was examined and
approved by the Council on Legal Education of the Ameri-
can Bar Association and by the State Education Depart-
ment of New York.
Professor Reese has been elected President Judge of
the Courts of Cumberland County; Professor Metzger has
been appointed Secretary of Revenue; Professor Irwin has
been appointed a member of the State Board of Examiners
of Public Accountants. F. Eugene Reader, of Beaver
Falls, Pennsylvania, and Dr. Wilbur H. Norcross, of Car-
lisle, have been added to the faculty.
W. H. HITCHLER
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
CONVEYANCE BY WIFE DIRECTLY TO HUSBAND
AND WIFE-INTERPARTY AGREEMENT ACT
The recently decided case of In re Vandegrift's Estate'
in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is an interesting
case of first impression in this jurisdiction. The question
raised and decided is: "May a married woman, who is the
sole owner of real property, convey it, with the joinder of
her husband, to her husband and herself, without the inter-
vention of a trustee, so as to create in the husband and
wife an estate by entireties?" The case holds that she
may so do. The opposing contention was that the husband
and wife held as tenants in common.
The case is doubly interesting in that it contains the
first appellate court recognition of the principle laid down
in Blease v. Anderson, that husband and wife may hold
realty as tenants in common rather than as tenants by en-
tireties. The present case admits, "***that a husband and
wife may take and hold as tenants in common, as individ-
uals and not as a common-law unity, if that be the actual
intent***." In this admission, the court is indubitably
correct.
The court further admits that at common law such a
conveyance could not be made because the common law
required distinct and separate grantors and grantees.
The conclusion that our law permitted such a result was
based on the effect of the Uniform Interparty Agreement
Act.8 That act states: "That a conveyance, release or
sale may be made to, or by two or more persons actly
jointly, and one or more, but less than all of these persons,
acting either by himself or themselves or with other per-
sons, and a contract may be made between such parties."
The basis for the court's interpretation of this section as
allowing the present conveyance is that the words "other
1161 A. 898 (1932).
2241 Pa. 198.
sMay 13, 1927, P. L. 984; 21 P. S. secs. 551-556.
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persons" in the act should be held to include the husband
or wife of a grantor in a deed of conveyance.
Admitting the validity of this conclusion, it does not
follow that the act permits the conveyance in question.
The grantors in the present deed were of necessity the
husband and wife, not the wife alone, even though the
land was owned by the wife. If the wife had been the
sole grantor the deed would have been invalid by virtue of
the act of 1893. 4 Hence we have a deed by two grantors
to the same two persons as grantees. The Interparty Act
does not permit the grantors and grantees in the convey-
ance to be identical. On either the side of the grantors or
the grantees must be less than all those on the other side.
The act distinctly states "****to, or by two or more persons
acting jointly, and one or more, but less than all these persons
****." The two or more persons who acted jointly were
husband and wife as grantors. The act then requires that
one of these, since there were but two, must be lacking in
the grantees. This requirement was not met in the in-
stant deed and it was therefore not permitted by virtue of
this act. Nor can the decision be justified by treating the
deed as though it contained but one grantor, the wife. The
court in its opinion treats the husband and wife grantees
as those designated by the act as "and one or more, but
less than all of these persons, acting either by himself, or
themselves or with other persons." Treating the convey-
ance as though it were made by the wife alone results in
the conclusion that the act would be totally inapplicable
for it requires plurality of persons on the other side. The
same objection could not be made to a deed by the husband
to himself and wife since the deed would be valid if he
were the sole grantor. In that event less than all who
were on one side of the conveyance would be on the other
side. But the wording of the act cannot be ignored be-
cause it would produce an unusual result. We conclude
4P.L 344.
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that the act does not validate the conveyance because of
the exact coincidence of grantors and grantees.
The result reached by the decision is desirable, avoid-
ing as it does the adoption of a more cumbersome and ex-
pensive procedure to reach the same result. The court
might better have justified its conclusion, however, by
adopting the reasoning of the dissenting opinion in In re
Klatzl's Estate5 which later became the ruling of the court
by adoption as the majority holding in Boehringer v.
Schmid.8 The New York court avoided the common law
rule requiring distinct and separate grantors by saying that
the grantor did not convey to himself as grantee but to a
unity or en'ity which was composed of the consolidation of
the grantor and another. In Michigan7 the court decided
that the result of a conveyance by the husband to him-
self' and wife jointly was to create a tenancy in common,
treating the grantor husband as having reserved to him-
self a one-half interest in the property. This result was
not intended and should not be the result unless the in-
tended result could not be reached.
The instant case is also novel in that it appears to be
the first case interpreting the Uniform Interparty Act. It
would seem that the act has not had an auspicious in-
augural in the courts.
Harold S. Irwin
INCONTROVERTIBLE PHYSICAL FACTS RULE IN
PENNSYLVANIA
The doctrine of "Incontrovertible Physical Facts", is
one that has received much attention from the courts 6f
Pennsylvania in the past few years. Although fore-
6110 N. E. 181 (N. Y. 1915).
6173 N. E. 220 (N. Y.).
'Wright v. Knapp, 150 N. W. 315 (Mich. 1915).
